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Beyond the Reach of Law?  






In August 1903 two Parisian plain clothes police officers from the notorious vice squad were 
convicted of illegal arrest, violence and assault (Arrestation arbitraire, violence et voie de faits 
volontaires) in the so-called Forissier Affair. What happened during the encounter itself, 
including the allegations of police violence and illegal arrest, was not particularly unusual for 
police-public relations in Paris. The case was unique because the two policemen subsequently 
faced criminal prosecution. During the French Third Republic, it was near impossible to 
prosecute police personnel for acts relating to their professional functions, such as illegal arrest, 
misuse of power, violence, manslaughter, and perjury. And while the Third Republic gave the 
majority of the male population a stake in democratic politics, citizens remained largely 
powerless in keeping public officials, including the police, accountable to the Penal Code. 
France was, of course, not the only European country where the overwhelming majority of 
alleged police illegality went unpunished. Lack of meaningful police accountability to the law 
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to the Marc Bloch Center in Berlin for providing a stimulating intellectual environment when developing this 
article alongside my research on criminal prosecution of police personnel in Wilhelmine Germany.  
was, and remains, a persistent problem in many countries.1 Yet, within this overarching pattern, 
the almost complete absence of prosecutions in the French Third Republic stands out,2 not only 
in comparison with contemporary Britain, but, more surprisingly, also with Prussia.3 In both 
these countries courts played an increasing role in keeping police personnel accountable to the 
law, and in settling civil disputes with citizens.4  
Patterns of prosecution against police personnel are significant for comparing 
governance because prosecution rates indicate the willingness of regimes to allow citizens to 
challenge public servants and have transparency around the handling of serious complaints. 
The way the Third Republic managed conflicts between police personnel and aggrieved 
citizens therefore reflects a significant aspect of how the Republic continued to exclude its 
citizens despite the democratisation of the political institutions. Furthermore, historians and 
                                                 
1 Samuel Walker and Carol Archbold, The New World of Police Accountability (Los Angeles, 2014), 50; Tim 
Prenzler, Police Corruption (Boca Raton, 2009); Petter Gottschalk, Police Management: Professional Integrity 
in Policing (New York, 2010), xii; Christopher J. Harris, “The Residual Career Patterns of Police Misconduct,” 
Journal of Criminal Justice, 40 (2012), 323-332.    
2 For figures on the persistence of low rates of prosecution of police personnel in France, see Fabien Jobard, 
Bavures policières? La force publique et ses usages (Paris, 2002) 257. 
3 This research emanates from a wider project comparing citizens’ access to complain about the police in London, 
Berlin and in Paris, 1880-1914. I am referring to ‘British’ policing, as including England, Wales and Scotland – 
but not Ireland, where the foundations for police accountability differed. As policing within the German Empire 
was organised at the level of federal states, references will be made here to Prussia, rather than the German Empire.  
4 Between 1884 and 1913, the Old Bailey in London prosecuted at least sixteen cases against members of the 
London Metropolitan police personnel. Many other cases from London were heard at the Sussex Crown Court, 
and the lower magistrates’ courts. At the Prussia Landgerichte, which handled serious cases of crime, there were 
no less than 556 prosecutions of police personnel between 1899 and 1905, leading to 400 convictions. Anja 
Johansen, “Policemen in the Dock: Criminal Prosecution of Police Personnel in Wilhelmine Prussia”, Crime, 
History & Societies/ Crime, histoire & sociétés, 23 no.2 (2019).  
police scholars have tended to assume that democratisation of a political regime would lead to 
greater police accountability.5 However, the comparison of the French Third Republic with 
Wilhelmine Prussia and Victorian/Edwardian Britain shows that citizens’ access to keep police 
personnel to account was unrelated to levels of democratisation of the political institutions. 
While British and Prussian citizens gained greater access to have their grievances against the 
police heard in court between the 1880s and 1914, the position of French citizens to challenge 
police personnel was as weak by 1914 as it had been in the 1870s. It is important to note that 
the non-prosecution of French police personnel continued long time after the Republic had 
stabilised, and that the criminal allegation against police which were presented to the public 
prosecutor invariably came from citizens who posed no threat to public order or to the stability 
of the Republic.  
This article has four objectives: the first is to establish evidence – as far as possible – 
of the extreme rarity of criminal prosecution of French police personnel. The estimated levels 
of non-prosecution of police personnel presented here cover all France and includes all types 
of policing personnel (the Paris and Lyon state police, and from 1908 also the Marseilles police 
forces; the gendarmerie; and municipal police forces). While more research is needed on the 
factors leading to non-prosecution of police personnel outside the Paris, the outcome was 
everywhere the same. The rest of the analysis in this article refers specifically to the Paris police 
force. The second objective is to shed light on the legal-procedural framework and 
                                                 
5 Hsi-Huey Liang, The Rise of modern police and the European state systems from Metternich to the Second World 
War (Cambridge, 1992); David Bayley, “The Police and Political Development in Europe”, in The Formation of 
the Nation State in Western Europe, ed. Charles Tilly (Princeton, 1975); For police scholars making this 
connection for more recent periods see: Robert Reiner, The Politics of the Police (4th ed.) (Oxford, 2010) chap.3; 
David Bayley, Changing the Guard: Developing democratic police abroad (Oxford, 2006); Peter Manning, 
Democratic Policing in a Changing World (Boulder, 2010). 
administrative practices that were used to obstruct criminal prosecution against members of the 
Paris police force. The third objective is to examine how the judiciary (public prosecutors, 
investigating magistrates and court judges) worked with the police prefect of Paris to prevent 
allegations against police personnel from reaching the courts. This is illustrated through three 
well-documented cases from Paris: the Nuger case of 1893 concerning accidental death during 
a major police intervention against student protesters; the case of the worker Zirn, who died in 
police custody in 1912; and the Forissier case of 1903 concerning police violence and illegal 
arrest, which exceptionally led to a trial. The fourth objective is to examine how civil liberties 
campaigners, notably the League of Human Rights (La Ligue des droits de l’homme, hereafter 
LDH), challenged police and the judiciary over their refusal to hold policemen accountable to 
the law.  
The extremely low rate of prosecution against police personnel in the French Third 
Republic exemplifies the discrepancy between the high-minded republican ideals and the 
reality of citizens’ disempowerment. The non-prosecution of police personnel also suggests 
that – while providing a convenient way out of potentially embarrassing problems – in the long 
run it seriously undermined attempts to strengthen public trust in the police and police 
legitimacy. Yet, while prosecution was almost impossible, the Forissier case and a few attempts 
at civil suits also show that the Paris police and criminal justice system in the early 20th century 




II. REPUBLICANISATION OF POLICING AND BLIND-SPOTS IN THE 
HISTORIOGRAPHY 
 
Until the 1990s, historical interpretations have been overwhelmingly negative about French 
policing. Left-leaning scholars have criticised the Third Republic for its heavy-handed police 
approaches to the public, questioning whether this could be justified in the name of ‘l’ordre 
républicain’. However, these interpretations focus mainly on protesters and policing strategies, 
not on the underlying structures of discipline and accountability.6 Since the 1990s, the negative 
interpretations of French police and gendarmerie have been fundamentally reassessed by Jean-
Marc Berlière and Jean-Noël Luc. Together with a younger generation of historians they have 
revised our understanding of policing as a profession as well as the internal functioning of 
French police forces and gendarmerie from the 18th to the 21st centuries.7 Yet, while their 
extensive research has shown that discipline was strengthened during the Third Republic, when 
police and gendarmerie became subjected to elected ministers, police accountability to the law 
is rarely mentioned8 and citizens’ complaints constitutes at best small sections in main 
syntheses on French policing.9 Berlière’s research on the vice squad analyses police 
                                                 
6 Philippe Vigier (ed.) Maintien de l'ordre et polices en France et en Europe au XIXe siècle (Paris, 1987); 
Madeleine Rebérioux (ed.), Fourmies et les premiers mai (Paris, 1994); Patrick Bruneteaux, ‘Le désordre de la 
repression en France, 1871-1921’, Genèses, 12 (1993) 32-55; idem, Maintenir L’ordre: Les transformations de 
la violence d’État en regime démocratique (Paris, 1996). 
7 Jean-Marc Berlière, Catherine Dénys, Dominique Kalifa, Vincent Milliot (eds.) Métiers de police (Rennes, 
2008); Quentin Deluermoz, Policiers dans la ville: La construction d’un ordre public à Paris, 1854-1914 (Paris, 
2012); Laurent Lopez, La Guerre des polices n’a pas eu lieu (Paris, 2014); see also special issue of Revue 
d’histoire du XIXe siècle, Quentin Deluermoz, Arnaud Houte and Aurélien Lignereux (eds.) “Société et forces de 
sécurité au XIXe siècle”, 50 (2015). On the French gendarmerie see Jean-Noël Luc (ed.) Gendarmes, État et 
société au XIXe siècle (Paris, 2002); ibid. Histoire des gendarmes, de la maréchausée à nos jours (Paris, 2016).  
8 The most detailed analysis is Jean-Marc Berlière, “L’Institution policière en France sous la IIIe République” 
(unpublished thèse d’état, University of Dijon), 1991, 369-411.  
9 Jean-Marc Berlière and René Lévy, Histoire des polices en France de l'Ancien Régime à nos jours (Paris, 2013) 
ch.6; Malcolm Anderson, In Thrall to Political Change: Police and Gendarmerie in France (Oxford, 2011) 31-
transgressions of the law and public outrage, but says little about attempts at prosecuting erring 
officers.10 
Berlière’s overall interpretation, which has influenced much of current scholarship, is 
a positive narrative that strongly emphasises improvements in professionalization and 
discipline among police personnel between 1870 and 1914.11 Berlière argues that it was the 
process of republicanisation that led to greater police loyalty towards the regime and 
engendered modern professional norms in the approach to the public, with lower levels of 
violence and malpractice. He strongly emphasises that after the turn of the 20th century, French 
policing was far better than its reputation with increased acceptance and popularity, at least 
among the propertied classes.12 While Berlière recognises the failure of the Third Republic to 
balance the need for public order against respect for citizens’ rights and liberties, as well as 
persistent problems of violence and illegality in French policing, he links this to extensive 
police powers and incomplete republicanisation.13 In his interpretation, the root cause of police 
                                                 
35 & 91; Deluermoz, Policiers dans la ville, 261-64. Christian Chevandier, Policiers dans la ville (Paris, 2012) is 
mainly focused on police perspectives. 
10 Jean-Marc Berlière, La Police des moeurs sous la IIIe République (Paris, 1992).  
11 Jean-Marc Berlière, “La professionalisation de la police en France: Un phénomène nouveau au début du XXème 
siècle”, Déviance et Société, 11, no.1 (1987) 67-104; idem, “La professionnalisation: Revendication des policiers 
et objectif des pouvoirs au début de la IIIème république”, Revue d’histoire moderne et contemporaine, 3 (1990) 
398-428; idem, Le Monde des polices (Paris, 1996) 69-76. 
12 Jean-Marc Berlière, Le Préfet Lépine: Vers la naissance de la police moderne (Paris, 1993) 117-19; idem, 
“Images de la police: deux siècles de fantasmes”, Jahrbuch für europäische Verwaltungsgeschichte 6 (June 1994), 
125-140; Berlière and Lévy, Histoire des polices; For similar interpretations see Anderson, In Thrall to Political 
Change; Deluermoz, Policiers dans la ville; López, Guerre des polices. 
13 Berlière, “L’Institution policière”, 369-411; idem “Police et libertés sous la IIIe République: le problème de la 
police des moeurs”, Revue Historique, 283, no.2 (1990) 235-75; idem “L’impossible police parisienne”, Politix, 
malpractice and illegality therefore stems from the inability to fully install republican values 
into policing, rather than the persistently weak position of French citizens to confront and 
challenge police malpractice and illegality.  
Deluermoz modifies Berlière’s overall interpretation on three significant points: first, 
he argues that improvements in French police behaviour, rather than simply being the product 
of republicanisation, began already during the Second Empire and was part of a longer process 
of civilization; secondly, Deluermoz adopts a more critical assessment of the impact of 
republicanisation on French policing; and, finally, he places the modernisation of French 
policing within a broader comparative context with British and German developments.14 Yet, 
Deluermoz looks at police-public relations mainly from the perspective of the police, paying 
scarce attention to the weak position of citizens. So while Deluermoz notes that the Paris police 
force, established by Napoleon III in 1854, was inspired by the London Metropolitan police,15 
he does not mention the two elements of the Peelite model which empowered the British public 
to challenge the police. These key features of the Peelite model were not transferred into the 
Paris police force in 1854 and the Third Republic subsequently made no attempt to empower 
citizens. In the Peelite model procedures that allowed members of the public to voice their 
concerns about acts – criminal or non-criminal – committed by police personnel constituted a 
                                                 
21, no.6 (1993) 33-51; idem “Du maintien de l’ordre républicain au maintien républicain de l’ordre”, Genèses, 12 
(mai 1993) 6-29. 
14 Deluermoz, Policiers dans la ville; idem, “L’Ordre est républicain”, in Une contre-histoire de la troisième 
République, eds. Marion Fontaine, Frédéric Monier and Christophe Prochasson (Paris, 2013) 88; idem “Capitales 
policières, état-nation et civilisation urbaine: Londres, Paris et Berlin au tournant du XIXe siècle”, Revue modern 
et contemporaine, 60, no.3 (2013) 55-85.  
15 Deluermoz, Policiers dans la ville, 32-35. 
central element in legitimising the London Metropolitan police since its inception in 1829.16 In 
Prussia, formal procedures for handling non-criminal complaints against the police were 
introduced in 1883, which gave aggrieved Prussians formal legal status and some basic rights 
to have their complaints investigated and to be informed about the outcome.17 In France, no 
formal complaints procedures existed until the early 21st century.18 During the Third Republic, 
disgruntled citizens complained incessantly at police stations, or through letters to the police 
prefect and the interior minister; however, French complainants had no legal status and the 
police was under no obligation to investigate. Another central legitimising feature in the Peelite 
police model was the emphasis on police being accountable to the law. In Britain, disputes 
were frequently being heard by the magistrates’ courts, and serious cases were forwarded to 
the Assizes, the Quarter Sessions or the Old Bailey in London. In Prussia, the increasing 
importance of the police operating within the law (Rechtsstaatsprinzip) gave the courts a 
central role both in settling civil disputes between individual citizens and public officials, and 
in processing criminal allegations, including thousands of cases involving police personnel.19 
                                                 
16 Select Committee, Report on the Police of the Metropolis (1834) Parliamentary Papers (600) vol.XVI, 8-9. For 
the complaints procedures of the late 19th century, see relevant entries in Howard Vincent, A Police Code and 
Manual of the Criminal Law (London, 1881); David Taylor, The new police in nineteenth-century England: 
Crime, conflict and control (Manchester, 1997) 77. 
17 Landesverwaltungsgesetz, July 30, 1883, articles 127-134. For details see Bernhard von Kamptz, Beschwerde 
und Klage sowie sonstige Rechtsmittel gegen polizeiliche Verfügungen und Zwangsmassregeln (Berlin, 1894) 23-
33 & 55ff. 
18 Le Comité nationale de déontologie de la sécurité was voted in 2000, and established as the first French police 
complaints body in 2001. 
19 Albrecht Funk, Polizei und Rechtsstaat: Die Entwicklung des staatlichen Gewaltmonopol in Preußen, 1848-
1918 (Frankfurt, 1986); Ann Goldberg, Honor, Politics and the Law in Imperial Germany (Cambridge, 2010); 
Johansen “Policemen in the dock”. 
In France, the lack of accountability to the law shaped not only how police approached the 
public, but also popular attitudes to the police. So while Berlière and Deluermoz both 
emphasise the increasing popularity and acceptance of the police, at least among the propertied 
sections of the population,20 this did not develop into a relationship of trust. New professional 
norms undoubtedly led to overall improvement in police behaviour, but popular distrust and 
the expectation that police would, at any moment, engage in violent and illegal behaviour 
continued to dominate popular attitudes to the French police.  
This article challenges the emphasis on incomplete republicanisation as the main cause 
of continued police malpractice and illegality. Instead, it highlights the consequences of the 
weak position of citizens in conflicts with the police, the unwillingness by successive 
republican government to strengthen the position of aggrieved citizens, and obstructions by the 
criminal justice system, which kept criminal allegations against police personnel effectively 
away from the courts. By focusing on the refusal by the Third Republic to reform the extremely 
asymmetrical power relationship between public servants and citizens, this article argues that 
the problem of continued police unaccountability was closely linked to the republican ideology 
itself, namely the systematic prioritisation of the authority of the Republic above the respect 
for citizens’ rights and civil liberties. This places this interpretation in line with the critical 
reassessment of the French republican tradition that was opened in the 1970s by François Furet 
                                                 
20 Berlière, Lépine; Deluermoz, Policiers dans la ville. 
and Jean-Pierre Machelon21, and continued in the 1990s by Rosanvallon.22 Patterns of 
prosecution against police personnel adds an important aspect to current historical debates 
about the long-term implications of the Jacobin legacy in the Third Republic, which placed the 
interest of the Republic above respect for civil liberties,23 and marginalised the liberal tradition 
that called for legal counterbalances against the overwhelming powers of the state.24 While 
recognising that the republican values of the Third Republic succeeded in establishing modern 
democratic principles, 25 its short-comings negatively shaped the relationship between citizens 
and the police. Whereas the current historiography on French policing focuses almost 
exclusively on the failure to curb extensive police powers and break the extra-legal operations 
of the vice-squad, this article also emphasises the unwillingness of successive republican 
governments to strengthen citizens’ access to challenge erring public servants through the 
courts. 
 
                                                 
21 François Furet, Penser la Révolution française (Paris, 1978); idem, La Révolution en débat (Paris, 1999); Jean-
Pierre Machelon, La République contre les libertés?Les Restrictions aux libertés publiques de 1879 à 1914 (Paris, 
1976). 
22 Pierre Rosanvallon, Le Sacre du citoyen (Paris, 1992/2001); idem, Le peuple introuvable (Paris, 1998/2002); 
idem, La démocratie inachevée (Paris, 2000/2003). See also Andrew Jainchill and Samuel Moyn, “French 
Democracy between Totalitarianism and Solidarity”, Journal of Modern History, 76, no.1 (2004) 107-154. 
23 See contributions to Vincent Duclert and Christophe Prochasson (eds.) Dictionnaire critique de la République 
(Paris, 2002); Sudhir Hazareesingh (ed.), The Jacobin Legacy in Modern France (Oxford, 2002); Fontaine et al. 
(eds.), Contre-histoire. 
24 Alexis de Tocqueville, L’Ancien regime et la révolution, [origin, publ. 1856] (Paris, 1952); Furet, Penser; 
Lucien Jaume, L’Individu effacé ou les paradoxes du libéralisme français (Paris, 1997) 367-405. 
25 James Lehning, To be a Citizen: The Political Culture of the Early French Third Republic (Ithaca, 2001); Sudhir 




III. AN INVISIBLE ASPECT OF POLICING: ABSENCE OF PUBLIC RECORDS AND 
ESTIMATES OF RATES OF PROSECUTION CASES 
 
Despite the historiography on French policing paying much attention to police violence and 
illegality, the near absence of criminal prosecution against police personnel is rarely 
commented upon.26 There are several reasons for this blind-spot in the historiography. In the 
first place, the issue is almost invisible in the public records. The files from the French Interior 
and Justice Ministries contain almost no relevant documentation, not even general discussions 
about the possibility of prosecuting police personnel.27 Among the records from the Paris 
Police Prefecture there are a substantial number of criminal allegations against police 
personnel, which members of the public sent to the public prosecutor. However, as these 
complaints were systematically forwarded to the police and handled as disciplinary cases, the 
criminal allegations are buried alongside hundreds of non-criminal complaints.28 Discussions 
of prosecution against police personnel is also absent from the minutes of the Paris municipal 
council, which was one of the main fora for critical debates on police malpractice. Extensive 
searched of the digitised minutes from the municipal council of Paris published in Le Bulletin 
                                                 
26 Berlière provides an excellent and detailed description of the legal-procedural framework, but does not comment 
on actual cases. Berlière, “L’Institution policière” 369-401.  
27 Archives Nationales (hereafter AN), série BB, contains no cases of this nature; The ‘Fond Moscou’ contains a 
number of disciplinary cases from the interwar era, none of which led to criminal prosecution. Nor has any case 
been found relating to the gendarmerie, which fell under the resort of the War Ministry. 
28 Archives de la Préfecture de Police, Paris (hereafter APP), BA 1554, Plaintes contre les commissaires 1896-
1906; APP, BA 899, Plaintes contre les commissaires de police et le personnel des commissariats 1907-1911. 
municipal officiel de la ville de Paris reveal no mentioning of criminal prosecutions of police 
personnel, beyond the few known cases. The internal publication for police managers, Journal 
des Commissaires de Police, is equally silent on the topic. Because a lot of research is required 
even to demonstrate that prosecution happened extremely rarely, it has been difficult for police 
historians to contextualise the few known incidents. Although Jean-Marc Berlière is well 
familiar with the Forissier case, he mentions it only in relation to debates about the vice squad, 
while his analysis of the legislation leads him to conclude that the articles in the Penal Code, 
which criminalised certain police acts, were never enforced in practice.29 
Although it is extremely difficult to estimate an approximate number of criminal 
prosecutions against the police, all available sources point towards the conclusion that this 
happened extremely rarely. No statistics exist on this phenomenon and the official court 
publication, La Gazette des Tribunaux, which lists all verdicts from French courts, is of little 
use as it only mentions the names of the defendants, not their professions. One significant clue 
to the rarity of prosecutions against police personnel appears in a register of all the cases 
presented to the public prosecutor of Paris that were subjected to preliminary investigation, but 
eventually not brought to trial (non-lieu). Between 1871 and 1914 there is but one single case 
in which the suspect was registered as a policeman.30 This was the highly publicised Nuger 
case of 1893, which will be analysed below. Given the frequent allegations of police illegality 
made by members of the public, this is a staggeringly low rate of investigation. Another 
important clue is provided by the campaigner Louis Fiaux. In an appendix to his book on the 
                                                 
29 Berlière, “Institution policière”, 396. Machelon makes the same point for public servants generally, noting that 
the articles 114-118 in the Penal Code concerning the criminal responsibility of public officials (fonctionnaires) 
were almost never used. Machelon,, République contre les libertés? 161-62. 
30 Archives Départementales de Paris (hereafter ADP), D3U6, box 46, ’Emeutes du Quartier Latin, mort du Sieur 
Nuger, tué accidentalement par un pot d’allumettes lancé par une main inconnue’.  
1903 extra-parliamentary inquiry into the policing of prostitution, Fiaux provides a list 
covering the years 1877 to 1899. He identifies forty-four cases, from all over France, of known 
criminal acts committed by police personnel from all types of forces including the 
gendarmerie, as well as illegal acts committed by mayors in their capacity as responsible for 
municipal police forces.31 Although many of these allegations concerned very serious offences, 
the police personnel involved were simply dismissed or retired, with only one case leading to 
criminal prosecution.32 In addition, there were a limited number of cases where policemen were 
prosecuted and convicted for criminal acts that were unrelated to their professional functions.33 
These extremely low numbers are in line with evidence provided by the LDH. Between 
1898 and 1914 the LDH repeatedly sought to bring criminal charges or civil suits against 
policemen and police managers, but failed in all but two of the ninety-nine cases that they 
supported.34 The LDH was unquestionably the organisation with the most extensive 
information and experience in the criminal prosecution of civil servants, including police 
personnel. So when the LDH stated in 1908 and again in 1910 that the Forissier case of 1903 
was the only known criminal prosecution against police personnel since the establishment of 
the LDH in 1898, this is probably the closest we can get to a reliable assessment of the limited 
                                                 
31 Louis Fiaux, Police des moeurs devant la Commission extra-parlementaire du régime des moeurs (Paris, 1907), 
611-621.  
32 “Affaire de Jean-Baptiste D…”, in which a former deputy station master appeared before the assizes court of 
the Lower Pyrenees in November 1886. Fiaux, Police des moeurs, 613. 
33 In 1879 a policeman was convicted of two gruesome murders, both unrelated to his professional functions, see 
Jean-Marc Berlière, “La cervelle du gardien de la paix” in Juges, notaires et policiers delinquents, ed. Benoît 
Garnot (Dijon, 1997), 141-160. Similarly, in April 1911 Inspector Louis Warzé was jailed for seven years for 
involvement with a gang of house-breaker; see Berlière, Police des moeurs, footnote 247. In addition, a number 
of police officers were prosecuted for financial corruption unrelated to their professional functions.  
34 The Forissier case of 1903 and the Favre case of 1904. 
number of cases.35 Similarly, Yves Guyot, who closely observed police malpractice throughout 
the period 1871-1914, mentions no incident of criminal prosecution in his multiple works, 
beyond the few known cases. Instead he stated repeatedly that complaints to the criminal justice 
system about police illegality were systematically ignored.36  
Press reports frequently declared isolated court rulings as a victory for victimised 
citizens; however, these cases invariably turn out to be incidents where the courts threw out 
cases against members of the public because police statements were mutually conflicting or 
obviously untrue. Acquittal, and official recognition by a judge that police had lied in court and 
fabricated the evidence, was the best aggrieved citizens could hope to obtain as redress for 
police malpractice. Even in the face of blatant perjury by police – which was a criminal offence 
under articles 177-183 of the Penal Code – not one single case has been identified where 
perjuring police faced subsequent criminal prosecution. Whether policemen were disciplined 




IV. POLICE CRITISM AND THE REPUBLICAN ‘AWKWARD SQUAD’  
 
                                                 
35 Bulletin officiel de la ligue des droits de l’homme, (hereafter BOLDH) 10-17 (Sept. 15, 1910) 1037-1088; 
BOLDH, 10-18 (Sept. 30, 1910) 1089-1152; BOLDH, 10-19 (Oct. 15, 1910). Similarly, the list of cases established 
in Mathias Morhardt, L’Oeuvre de la Ligue des droits de l’homme, 1898-1910 (Paris, 1911), 139-144 & 164-165.  
36 Yves Guyot, “Révélations d’un ex-agent des moeurs,” La Lanterne, (Oct-Nov. 1878); idem, “Lettres d’un vieux 
petit employé,” La Lanterne, (Dec. 1878 to Jan. 1879); idem, La Prostitution: Etudes de Physiologie Sociale I 
(Paris, 1882); idem, La Police: Etudes de Physiologie Sociale II, (Paris, 1884), 19-20; 257, 278 & 308.  
Criticism of police malpractice emerged in the early years of the Republic, not just from anti-
republican forces, but from staunch republicans37 who were disappointed that senior officials 
and elected politicians representing the new regime seemed to replicate the Second Empire in 
turning a blind eye to police violence and illegality. Drawing parallels between the police of 
Napoleon III and the Republic was provocative, given that republicans during the Second 
Empire had pointed to police brutality and illegality as evidence of the moral corruption of the 
imperial regime, and both Gambetta and Jules Ferry attempted to abolish the Police Prefecture 
and the Paris Police as their first acts in office.38 Yet, throughout the 1870s and 1880s few 
attempts were made to strengthen police accountability to the law. The founding fathers of the 
Republic had other pressing priorities. Because the Third Republic was a nervous regime, 
particularly in the immediate aftermath of the Commune, republicans prioritised the urgent 
need to ensure the loyalty of the policemen, many of whom had previously worked for the 
Second Empire. So despite strong political will among republicans in 1870-1871 to reform the 
police and gendarmerie of the Second Empire to fit the new regime,39 unreconstructed policing 
practices from earlier regimes were carried over into the ‘governmentality’ of the Third 
Republic, largely unaffected by the democratisation of the political institutions.40 The 
insulation of police from any meaningful accountability to the law was allowed to persist 
because of the great ideological diversity among republicans and fundamental disagreements 
about what the relationship should be between the Republic and its citizens.41 There was broad 
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agreement about principles such as the ‘will of the people’, as expressed through universal 
male suffrage, rule of law, supremacy of the law, secularisation, as well as individual liberties 
such as freedom of speech and freedom of worship. However, uncertainty arose over the 
balance between the powers accorded to those acting on behalf of the state and the protections 
granted to individual citizens against public officials. Although ‘individual liberties’ 
constituted key principles for most republicans, these liberties were frequently disregarded if 
they conflicted with what ministers saw as their duty to uphold the law and the republican 
order.42 Legal provisions from previous regimes had allowed the interests of the regime and 
the powers of public officials to prevail over the rights of citizens, and the new power holders 
were reluctant to give up these tools, particularly in view of the fragile political situation during 
the 1870s and 1880s. So while the Republic promised to staunchly defend citizens’ personal 
safety and property against crime and public disorder when committed by other citizens,43 it 
avoided any commitment to guaranteeing citizens’ rights against transgressions perpetrated by 
public officials. While dubious or illegal decisions by most types of public officials could be 
challenged through the administrative courts, transgressive acts committed by police personnel 
often fell outside the remit of the administrative courts as these dealt only with the legality of 
administrative decisions, not with how they were enforced. Moreover, as there was no access 
to private prosecution within the French criminal justice system, aggrieved citizens could not 
press charges against the will of the public prosecutor.44 
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It was in this context that some staunch republicans embarked on repeated crusades 
against police malpractice, illegality and unaccountability. The most outspoken and persistent 
police critic was Yves Guyot, journalist and municipal councillor in Paris, described by 
Madelaine Rebérioux as an ‘uncompromising liberal’ (liberal acharné).45 In 1878-1879, he 
published a series of anonymous letters in the journal La Lanterne revealing widespread 
malpractice and illegality within the Paris police force.46 This led to a six months sentence for 
libel for him and his publisher Sigismond Lacroix, but Guyot continued undeterred during the 
1880s with revelations about violations of citizens’ rights and civil liberties in multiple 
publications on policing and on the treatment of prostitutes and the mentally ill.47 He was an 
early member of Josephine Butler’s ‘International Federation for the Abolition of Regulated 
Prostitution’, and worked closely with Louis Fiaux in his longstanding campaign against 
registered prostitution in France. Guyot also conducted a major campaign to subject the Paris 
police to oversight by the Paris municipal council. Yet, with the ascent of true republicans to 
government after 1879, the Paris municipal council lost whatever limited control they exercised 
over the police. By 1887, the Paris police prefect was much strengthened and only responsible 
to the interior minister.48 
Guyot belonged to a minority among French republicans, whose approach to the rights 
of citizens against the State and emphasis on the need for effective guarantees of respect for 
civil liberties was in line with the thinking Tocqueville and the English liberal tradition of John 
                                                 
45 Rebérioux, “Les Droits de l’homme”, in Duclert et al., Dictionnaire critique, 162-7. 
46 Guyot, “Revélations”; idem, La Préfecture de police par un vieux, petit employé: Procès de la Lanterne (Paris, 
1879).  
47 Guyot, Prostitution; idem, Police; idem, Un fou (Paris, 1884). 
48 Deluermoz, Policiers dans la ville, 226-7. 
Stuart Mill.49 So when Deluermoz describes respect of civil liberties in the British police 
rhetoric as a British peculiarity which was alien to French policing,50 this is, of course, correct 
if we look only at the police rhetoric, government policies and criminal justice practices. 
However, Deluermoz overlooks how, in France from the 1870s onward, criticism of police 
malpractice and illegality was shaped by discourses about accountability and respect for 
citizens’ rights. During the 1880s there were repeated attempts to form organisations for the 
defence and promotion of citizens’ rights.51 While the leagues of the late 19th century are mostly 
associated with the far-right,52 some were firmly republican, promoting civil libertarian 
principles, even if they never formed a coherent ideology. They involved well-known 
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politicians, journalists and intellectuals, many of whom also joined the pro-Dreyfus campaign, 
and later reappeared in the LDH.53  
The LDH emerged out of the pro-Dreyfus campaign as the largest civil liberties 
organisation anywhere in Europe, with considerable scope for challenging the republican 
authorities over police malpractice and unaccountability. It benefitted from substantial 
financial and investigatory resources, and enjoyed significant influence within the republican 
establishment. Its more than 50,000 members included many lawyers, some of whom occupied 
senior positions within the judicial professions or were very distinguished legal scholars. 
Among its members we also find numerous politicians - including parliamentarians, senators 
and several former government ministers – as well as university professors, public intellectuals, 
journalists and newspaper proprietors.54   
With the rapid expansion of the French press and the rise of mass-literacy, connections 
to the press became crucial for mobilising public opinion.55 However, the media were highly 
fragmented in their attitude towards police malpractice and accountability. As a result, press 
coverage of individual cases and campaigns were highly partisan and divided along political 
lines, so any categorisation of publications on this issue is tentative and allegiances underwent 
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changes over time.56 The newspapers least involved in criticising the police were the most 
widely circulated publications, Le Petit Parisien and Le Petit Journal, together selling close to 
two million copies in 1904.57 As they specialised in sensation and crime, they depended on a 
cosy relationship with police and detective forces, and tended to treat the police as heroes 
against crime and political subversion.58 
The most persistent and challenging criticism of the police came from the moderate 
republican and left-liberal press, which included newspapers like Le Matin, Le Temps, Le 
Siècle, L’Aurore, La Lanterne and Le Radical, mostly supportive of the pro-Dreyfus campaign 
in the late 1890s, and all with some later connections to the LDH.59 They not only highlighted 
isolated cases of police malpractice, but used embarrassing evidence to promote wider agendas 
pushing for greater police accountability. Yet, their critical campaigns were firmly pro-
republican, and their aim was to strengthen the republican regime. Considering that police 
malpractice and unaccountability were detrimental to the reputation and legitimacy of the 
republican regime, they sought to force republican ministers and parliamentarians to commit 
to higher standards of accountability and become more responsive to citizens’ grievances. On 
the other hand, when it came to conflicts between police and Catholics demonstrating against 
the laws of separation of Church and State, or police intervening against anti-republican forces 
on the far-left or the far-right, the moderate republican and left-liberal media were firmly 
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supporting the ‘republican order’. With a joint circulation of 400,000-500,000 by 1904,60 their 
campaigns were far more widely propagated than the more visceral criticism emanating from 
the socialist press, whose main newspapers, La Petite République, L’Humanité, La Bataille 
syndicale and numerous smaller publications, rarely exceeded 150,000.61 Of similar circulation 
were the far-right publications, mainly La Libre Parole, L’Intransigeant, and Action française. 
Both the socialist press and the far-right press, focused on police malpractice for the purpose 
of castigating such incidents as a reflection of the rottenness and hypocrisy of the republican 
regime and its institutions.  
The most unpredictable players on the question of police malpractice were the centre-
right and conservative publications, such as Le Figaro, L’Éclair, L’Echo de Paris or the 
Catholic daily La Croix, who sometimes joined the outrage against the police. However, their 
engagement largely depended on whether the victim was middle-class, respectable and not 
associated with their political opponents. These publications tended to focus on the fact that 
police had misjudged a situation and arrested the wrong type of person, but they rarely voiced 
concern about extensive police powers and lack of accountability. While the centre-right and 
conservative newspapers were mostly sympathetic to police interventions against left-wing 
protesters, no matter how grotesquely violent, they did turn against policing measures during 
the demonstrations against the implementation of anti-Catholic legislation in the early 1880s 
and the laws on separation of Church and State, 1903-1905. The politicisation of the press 
coverage relating to police malpractice and the profound disunity over acceptable standards in 
policing often allowed ministers and politicians to weather the storm and ignore calls for reform 
and stricter control of the police.  
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Media outcry and press campaigns only marginally affected individual policemen or 
managers. As the republic stabilised, police managers were – somewhat paradoxically – 
increasingly in a position to ignore public consternation over police malpractice. In the 1870s 
Guyot’s revelations of serious malpractice within the Paris police led to the resignation of 
Police Prefect Gigot. Yet his successor in the 1880s, Police Prefect Andrieux, publicly mocked 
the idea that police should become transparent and accountable to the public, to the law, or to 
the Paris municipal council.62 While the press repeatedly drew public attention to problems of 
serious malpractice within the vice squad, the reaction from police managers was a bit of 
irritation, but mostly hostile indifference.63 Louis Lépine, who held the post as Paris police 
prefect from 1893 to 1913, tended to ignore public outrage, and treated the press as well as 
elected bodies such as the Paris municipal council with contempt. After the turn of the century, 
Lépine appeared to believe himself untouchable, as his position only depended on the support 
of the interior minister, and successive interior ministers had come to believe that Lépine was 
the only guarantor of effective maintenance of public order in Paris.64 Further down the police 
hierarchy police personnel only depended on the support by Lépine, and he was fiercely 
protective of his men when criticised by the press.65 Rank-and-file policemen might face 
disciplinary action over misdeeds revealed by the press, but could be confident that no criminal 
sanctions would follow, no matter what was revealed by the press. 
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V. PUBLIC PROSECUTORS AND THE POLICE: 
COLLABORATION AND STANDARD PROCEDURES OF COMMUNICATION 
 
The French Penal Code contained several articles establishing criminal responsibility for public 
officials. These included a range of offences, some of which related to public officials in 
general, such as misuse of power, corruption, perjury,66 and some which applied specifically 
to police personnel, such as excessive violence and arbitrary arrest.67 While the articles in the 
Penal Code were clear, the application of the law could be obstructed in numerous ways. 
Unfortunately, no comprehensive description seems to exist of the legal-procedural framework 
relevant for the prosecution of police personnel, so the historian has to piece together rules and 
statutes from odd corners of the legislation. These include both the rules and statutes that were 
relevant for initiating prosecution, but most importantly also many clauses which were 
employed to justify non-prosecution.  
One major difficulty for complainants arose from the lack of clarity in defining the legal 
boundaries around policing. This eliminated the vast majority of allegations, as most extreme 
police acts could be classified as technically legal. The article 10 of the Code of Criminal 
Procedures accorded vast and vague powers to the police to enter into private spaces, search 
and remove anything of interest. An attempt in the late 1870s to remove or restrict this article 
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came to nothing due to opposition from Interior Minister Lepère and Police Prefect Andrieux.68 
Similarly, acts of violence, which were illegal under normal circumstances, became justifiable 
when committed during major public order operations because the policemen were acting 
under orders.69 During public order operations the instructions issued to the police tended to be 
very vague, and thereby gave blanket sanctions to arrest and to use violence. As a result, it was 
extremely difficult to challenge such acts as illegal. The removal of criminal responsibility for 
policemen acting under orders was all the more serious because of the absence of any concept 
of proportionality in the use of force, except for very general instructions to act with 
“moderation”.70 As long as an act served a legitimate purpose (motif légitime) it would not be 
deemed illegal.71 In addition, a 1817 ruling from the Cour de cassation established that 
“legitimate self-defence” could never be used as justification for obstructing or resisting a 
public official, irrespective of whether the action of the public official was disproportionate or 
illegal.72 Protesters were by definition disrupting the public order. Even public gatherings or 
demonstrations which were authorised as legal could be broken up at any moment, as it was up 
to the police to determine whether and when a gathering became a threat to the public order. 
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When police intervened it was with unrestricted force, and with no distinction made between 
protesters and random by-standers. 
Another problem for potential complainants arose from the competing legal and 
administrative principles which made the legal responsibility of public servants, including the 
police, highly ambiguous. Some areas of policing – most notably the policing of prostitution – 
were defined as ‘administrative acts’ (actes administratives) rather than ‘juridical acts’ (actes 
judiciaries). While the legality of administrative decisions could be challenged in the 
administrative courts, illegal enforcement by the vice squad of an otherwise legal 
administrative decision fell into a void between the jurisdiction of the administrative courts and 
the ordinary courts.73 This legal void was further cemented by the long-established principle 
that civil and criminal courts should not judge the actions of the executive, which included the 
police. This principle rested on article 75 of the Napoleonic Constitution of 1799, according to 
which civil or criminal prosecutions of public officials could only take place after a decision 
by the State Council (Conseil d’État). Although article 75 was abolished in 1871, in practice, 
civil and criminal courts continued to systematically declare themselves “incompetent” to 
judge members of the executive, well into the 20th century. As a result, some police actions – 
notably the operations by the vice squad – existed in a twilight zone where boundaries between 
legality and illegality were fluid to the point of making the letter of the Penal Code null and 
void.  
A third problem derived from the implementation of the Penal Code by the judiciary. 
The question arises whether the low rates of prosecutions reflect the unwillingness of French 
prosecutors and judges to prosecute police personnel, or their inability to do so, due to police 
obstruction. Contemporary critics of the police, including the LDH, scorned the judiciary for 
                                                 
73 Berlière, Police des moeurs, Chapter II. 
being intimidated by the police and described the police as treating the judiciary with 
contempt.74 Allegations against the police presented French prosecutors with an unenviable 
dilemma. They needed to uphold the law, but also depended on a good relationship with the 
police for investigation of all other cases, and could therefore ill afford serious conflicts with 
the police. Moreover, police controlled the physical evidence relating to conflictual encounters 
with the public, so police had considerable scope for “constructing” what happened during 
contentious events. While these patterns have been observed in many jurisdiction, past and 
present,75 in France accused policemen were particularly sheltered from the full force of the 
investigative process. Firstly, the French procedures placed particular importance on obtaining 
a confession.76 A policeman who sought to avoid making a confession had the advantage that 
he was unlikely to be subjected to the extreme techniques that police commonly used to extract 
confessions from ordinary suspects. Secondly, French prosecutors and judges tended to accord 
limited weight to independent witnesses, while treating police testimony as “evidence” rather 
than statements77. Accused policemen could also rely on the support from successive police 
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prefects, from Andrieux to Lépine, who strongly objected to external scrutiny and any 
boundaries placed on their personnel.  
The multiple reports and correspondence circulating between the public prosecutor 
(procureur de la république) and the police prefecture reveal that the relationship was 
characterised by collaboration rather than mutual hostility. Instead of challenging the police 
prefect over allegations of police illegality, prosecutors and investigating judges played an 
active role in keeping serious allegations against police personnel away from the courts. The 
Napoleonic Code of Criminal Instruction had removed decisions concerning prosecution away 
from the justices of peace (juges de paix), and made the public prosecutor the sole gatekeeper 
to the criminal justice system. He had the authority to determine whether a case should be 
examined as a felony (crime) by an investigating magistrate (juge d’instruction), whether it 
should be reclassified as a less serious offence (délit) or whether it should be abandoned.78 Yet, 
despite occupying a powerful position within the criminal justice structures, French 
prosecutors, and the judiciary in general, were also fragile compared to their British and 
Prussian counterparts.79 Although benefitting from the status of public officials 
(fonctionnaires), French prosecutors and judges experienced significant decline in their status 
and independence during the 1880s.80 Most members of the judiciary were no longer notables, 
but depended on their legal career as main income, and the politicisation of appointments and 
promotions made them vulnerable to changes in the political power constellations. Throughout 
the 19th century there had been several rounds of mass-sacking (épurations) among the higher 
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echelons of the judiciary, with the most recent wave in 1879-1883 still fresh in mind by the 
turn of the century.81 Moreover, the independence of the judiciary and their security of tenure 
were also challenged as republicans in government suspected the judiciary of harbouring anti-
republican sentiments and clerical sympathies.82 Individual prosecutors therefore had good 
reasons to fear getting on the wrong side of influential people and to avoid conflicts with 
powerful sections of the establishment. Unlike Prussia, where there were strong precedents 
throughout the 19th century for criminally prosecuting public servants, often with the Prussian 
state as plaintiff,83 for a French prosecutor to open a case against members of the police not 
only carried the risk of a confrontation with the powerful Paris police prefect, it would also 
breach the long-established practice of not prosecuting anyone acting on behalf of the French 
state. This alone would have brought any prosecutor many enemies within the republican 
establishment.  
French prosecutors had several avenues within the legal-procedural structures to 
remove themselves from the uncomfortable task of prosecuting members of the police.84 
According to the Napoleonic Code on Criminal Procedure,85 once a public prosecutor had 
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decided that a case should be investigated, it would be transferred to an investigating magistrate 
who would lead the criminal investigation undertaken by the detective branch (police 
judiciaire). This is how the system was supposed to operate, and this was how complainants – 
including the otherwise well-informed LDH – clearly believed it worked when they sent their 
allegations against the police to the public prosecutor.86 However, documents from the police 
prefecture show that all allegations against police personnel that were sent to the public 
prosecutor were systematically forwarded to the police prefecture within three or four days.87 
The police prefect then transferred the case to the internal disciplinary body, le contrôle 
general, as standard practice. By this transaction the criminal allegation was conveniently 
redefined as a disciplinary issue. Although the police prefect did enjoy the authority to receive 
criminal complaints and open investigations,88 this did not include the discretion to reduce a 
criminal allegation to a disciplinary matter.    
The transfer of criminal allegations from the public prosecutor to the contrôle général 
had important implications for the complainant. Little is known about the internal disciplinary 
investigations themselves, as only the final reports have been kept. However, it is clear that 
there were few formal rules around internal disciplinary investigations and they accorded no 
rights to the complainant. She or he might be called to make a statement, but often was not. 
The contrôle général was not a complaints body or a juridical investigatory body; its only 
concern was breaches of the disciplinary code. However, the core subject of citizens’ 
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complaints often did not concern acts that violated the disciplinary code, as discipline only 
related to acts which police managers saw as harmful to the good functioning of their 
organisation. Quite apart from the rather capricious and inconsistent enforcement of 
discipline,89 the disciplinary code was utterly unsuited to addressing concerns from members 
of the public about the way law enforcement affected their personal dignity and bodily integrity 
as well as their rights as citizens. 
Seen from the perspective of the complainant, investigations by the contrôle général 
constituted a black box without any transparency or obligations in relation to the complainant. 
It was entirely up to the police what information they released to complainants about the 
handling and the outcome of their case. Sometimes a copy of the report from the contrôle 
général was sent to the public prosecutor, but he was under no obligation to inform the 
complainant as this was not a juridical investigation. Furthermore, the complainant would 
never know whether investigations by the contrôle général led to any disciplinary action.90 In 
rare instances, the complainant got some financial compensation, but the case was kept out of 




VI. SEEKING NOT TO FIND: THE DEATH OF YOUNG NUGER IN 1893 
 
As investigations against police personnel were few, general patterns are difficult to draw. 
Nevertheless, all documented cases point towards the judiciary playing an active role in 
                                                 
89 Johansen, “Citizens’ Complaints”, 181-6. 
90 APP, BA 899, Plaintes contre les commissaires de police et le personnel des commissariats 1907-1911: 
Complaint by Mlle. Bosquet against Police Commissioner Niclausse, April 1910. 
preventing allegations against police personnel from entering the criminal justice process. The 
only known case from Paris – apart from the Forissier case of 1903 – which got as far as being 
examined by an investigating magistrate sheds interesting light on the role of the judiciary.  
On July 1, 1893 a young man named Nuger was killed during a police intervention 
against rioting students when a group of demonstrators sought refuge in a café at the corner of 
Boulevard St. Michel and Place de la Sorbonne. During the hurly-burly of the police operation, 
one policeman was seen by several witnesses hurling a heavy porcelain match-holder with full 
force into the crowded café. The match-holder landed with considerable force on the head of 
the unfortunate Nuger, a customer with no connection to the riot, who was simply enjoying a 
quiet coffee with some friends. He died of his injuries during the night without having regained 
consciousness. According to the press reports this was the first death during riot policing in 
Paris since the Commune of 1871.91 The rarity of fatalities naturally heightened the pressure 
on the public prosecutor to investigate. 
What actually happened and who was ultimately responsible for Nuger’s death is not 
the concern here. The key issues are rather the strange choices and priorities of the public 
prosecutor and the investigating magistrate. At least two anomalies in the investigation suggest 
that they were actively trying to avoid identifying the match-holder throwing police officer.92 
In the first place, a significant number of the policemen, who were present at Place de la 
Sorbonne, were absent when witnesses were invited to identify the policeman who had thrown 
the match-holder. A list provided by the police to the investigating magistrate on July 7 clearly 
stated that policemen from three units had been present: forty-six policemen from the 5th 
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d’allumettes lancé par une main inconnue”. 
arrondissement, forty from the 1st central brigade and sixteen from the 2nd central brigade.93 
Yet, the press reports only mention police from the 5th arrondissement and the 1st central 
brigade, and the first parading of police personnel before witnesses only included policemen 
from these two units. This matters because, while several witnesses claimed that the policeman 
who launched the match-holder carried number 105, one witness noted that it was number 105 
from the 2nd central brigade.94 The investigating magistrate was in possession of all this 
information; yet when a second parade before witnesses was organised on July 11 only four 
out of sixteen policemen from the 2nd brigade participated, and the policeman with number 105 
was not among them. The witness who had claimed that the thrower came from the 2nd brigade 
was subsequently vilified by the investigating magistrate as an attention-seeking fantasist and 
subjected to vicious character assassination by the investigators.95 
From July 4 onwards, the investigating magistrate increasingly focused his attention on 
a young policeman, Claude Révardeau, who had resigned from the police of the 5th 
arrondissement immediately after the events. From July 19, he was the only person under 
investigation. Révardeau explained that he had resigned from the force for personal reasons. 
As a local boy of the 5th arrondissement, he felt unable to act as a policeman in the local 
community after all his friends and neighbours had seen him involved in this heavy-handed 
police intervention. He also stated that at the time he handed over his resignation papers he was 
unaware that someone had been killed. After his resignation, Révardeau was a convenient 
target for investigation as he was no longer a member of the police. By coincidence he had also 
carried the number 155, which was sufficiently close to 105 to justify placing him under 
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suspicion. However, according to his own statement, supported by police documents, he had 
been nowhere near the Place de la Sorbonne on that day, so it should have been fairly easy to 
establish his innocence. Nevertheless, the investigating magistrate continued to focus on 
Révardeau for the following eighteen months, before concluding in December 1894 that it had 
been impossible to establish enough evidence to prosecute him – a so-called non lieu. This was 
hardly surprising, since there was never a shred of evidence that Révardeau had anything to do 
with Nuger’s death. By December 1894 public attention had long moved on, and few 
newspapers mentioned this outcome, even among the left-leaning and socialist newspapers that 
had reported extensively on the case in the summer of 1893.96 Reading through the files, it is 
hard to avoid drawing the conclusion that the public prosecutor and the investigating magistrate 
did their very best to avoid identifying the actual “thrower”. The obvious omissions in the 
investigation process, particularly in the parading of police before witnesses, and the 





VII. THE DEATH OF THE WORKER ZIRN IN POLICE CUSTODY:  
A CASE OF INSTITUTIONAL COVER-UP? 
 
While the death of Nuger was very public and initially generated a lot of press attention, the 
death of the worker Zirn in police custody in September 1912 reflects all the problems arising 
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Nuger’s home town of Clermont-Ferrand. There were also a few mentionings in 1893 from the popular press Le 
Journal and Le Petit Parisien.     
from lack of independent eyewitnesses, disregard for non-police witnesses, complete police 
control of evidence – and as this case testifies – obvious involvement of the judiciary in 
covering up deaths in police custody. Whether this case was highly unusual or merely the tip 
of an iceberg is impossible to verify. Throughout the late 19th and early 20th centuries the 
French press was teeming with allegations about individuals who had died in police custody 
due to police violence rather than to accidents or suicide, as officially claimed. Even the police 
slang for beating up people in custody, “passage à tabac”, was familiar to the general public. 
Yet, police did not keep a register of deaths in custody, and documentation from the authorities 
is almost non-existent, except for this case, which generated considerable paperwork and 
internal police communications.97 Zirn’s death thereby provides rare insights into the 
procedures followed by the police when people died in custody. The documents reveal a well-
oiled machinery for covering-up any such deaths, involving not only the police, but also the 
judiciary (le parquet), whose authorisation was required for getting the dead body six feet 
under, quickly, and without the family being allowed to see it. 
The death of Zirn only became an issue for the police because details about the state of 
his body were leaked to the press and created embarrassment for the police. It also mobilised 
Clemenceau as Interior Minister to demand an explanation from Police Prefect Lépine, as 
Clemenceau had personally sought to bring an end to random beatings of arrestees with a 
circulaire that was posted in all police stations.98 It is revealing that when Police Prefect Lépine 
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requested an explanation from the local station master, his concern was not why Zirn had died 
in police custody, but how an outsider got access to the dead body.99 
The details of the case are very similar to many others reported in the socialist press 
and in publications critical of the police like La Lanterne or the Bulletin Officiel of the LDH. 
One Friday night September 13, 1912, two workers were on a jolly night out in Saint-Ouen, 
one of the outer suburbs of Paris. They were arrested for being drunk and disorderly and spent 
the night in police custody. By dawn, Saturday September 14, one of them – with the unusual 
name Privat Zirn100 – was dead. The police explained that he had committed suicide by hanging 
himself from the window in his cell. Within hours, the local police doctor, Thobois, examined 
the body and signed the papers certifying that Zirn had committed suicide by hanging. The 
same day, the judicial authorities (le parquet) authorised the police to bury the body, and the 
date for the burial was set for the following Monday, September 16, at 10 am.101 The speedy 
arrangements between the police and the parquet of bureaucratic formalities – death certificate 
and authorisation for burial – gives the strong impression that this was not an isolated case, and 
that bureaucratic procedures were well in place to deal with such incidents. The parquet also 
showed a remarkable lack of curiosity about the details of Zirn’s death. It issued the death 
certificate stating that he had committed suicide based exclusively on the information provided 
by the local police at St. Ouen. The doctor who signed the death certificate two days later was 
the police medic from the Paris Police Prefecture and the family was not allowed to see the 
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body or to have it independently examined. Moreover, it remains unexplained why the police 
should arrange, and pay for, the burial of someone committing suicide in custody. The family 
protested that suicide was not in line with Zirn’s character and his mate, Odin (or Audin), who 
had been locked up in a separate cell, later declared that there had been no indication when 
they parted that Zirn was about to commit suicide.102 
Events took an unexpected turn on Sunday evening September 15 when a gentleman, 
presenting himself as Doctor Meslier, appeared at the police station, asking to see the station 
master. The police secretary on duty was expecting a police doctor named Millet from the 
Police Prefecture who was supposed to sign the death certificate, thereby officially stating that 
Zirn had died by suicide. As the two names “Mesliers” and “Millet” sound rather similar in 
French, the police secretary committed the error of allowing Doctor Meslier to inspect the 
body.103 As it turned out, Doctor Meslier was not from the Police Prefecture. He was a local 
socialist politician, senator and deputy mayor (adjoint au maire) of Saint-Ouen, who just 
happened also to be a medical doctor by profession. As Meslier was unexpectedly given access 
to Zirn’s body, he applied his professional skills and later revealed his observations to the press. 
He found that one of Zirn’s arms was broken in three places, there were multiple severe bruises 
(ecchymoses) to the face, torso, arms and legs some of which seemed to be caused by boot 
heels. The torso was violet, with coagulated blood covering one elbow; both hands were 
described as severely swollen and bruised, with similar injuries to the legs. Meslier also 
observed traces around Zirn’s neck from the rolled-up shirt by which the body was found 
hanged. In a later statements to the investigating magistrate, Meslier declared that it was 
unlikely that a man in such a physical state – with a broken arm, severely swollen hands and 
                                                 
102 Odin’s statement to the investigating magistrate Tortat was published in L’Humanité, October 17, 1912. 
103 APP, KA 80, Dossier du personnel – Rouget No 77907: Typed report by Commissaire Rouget, Station Master 
at St. Ouen, to the General Secretary for police personnel, September 24, 1912. 
furthermore described by both police and his mate Odin as extremely drunk – would have been 
able to undress himself, bind his shirt into a noose, tie it to a window two metres up the wall 
and hang himself, all within the space of five minutes, as the police claimed.104 
Meslier’s first action was to use his position as deputy mayor to stop the funeral from 
going ahead on Monday morning at 10 am.105 Instead, Zirn’s widow made a complaint to the 
public prosecutor for unlawful homicide by “unknown”. By this time, the up-coming socialist 
lawyer Pierre Laval had appeared at the scene, acting on behalf of the Zirn family. Instead of 
being buried, the body was transferred to the morgue, awaiting the official autopsy ordered by 
the public prosecutor. Only on the following Friday September 21, eight days after Zirn’s death, 
did the young star pathologist Charles Paul conduct the official autopsy on behalf of the public 
prosecutor. He concluded that the body was in such a state of decay (putréfaction extrêmement 
développée) that it was impossible to identify bruises or concussions, but “nothing excludes 
the possibility that he had died from hanging”.106 The report says nothing about Meslier’s 
allegations of broken bones. 
It took another six days before an investigating magistrate, Tortat, was assigned 
responsibility for the case. With the official autopsy being inconclusive and Dr. Meslier 
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challenging the conclusions of the forensic pathologist on several points, the investigating 
magistrate came to the conclusion on December 9, 1912 that it was not possible to determine 
whether Zirn had died of a severe beating before he was hanged – as Dr. Meslier claimed – or 
whether he had committed suicide. The investigating magistrate therefore closed the case. 
Madame Zirn sought to challenge this before the prosecuting authorities (la chambre des mises 
en accusation), but nothing came of it.107  
The Zirn case shows the crucial role that the judiciary could play in preventing the 
proper investigation of a case. From the moment of the discovery of the body in the early hours 
of Saturday September 14, a well-oiled bureaucratic machinery was set in motion, with the 
parquet authorising a speedy burial without involvement of the family or independent 
observers. From the outset the judicial authorities accepted the police explanation of suicide 
without further questions. After Meslier had raised legitimate questions about the cause of 
death, the investigating magistrate missed multiple opportunities for proper investigation; 
neither the forensic pathologist acting for the public prosecutor nor the investigating magistrate 
showed any sign of urgency, but left the body to decompose to the extent that no cause of death 
could be established. As with the Nuger case two decades earlier, the prosecution authorities 
showed little interest in seriously investigating or challenging the explanations provided by the 
police. Whether by design or by incompetence, this allowed the investigating magistrate to 
conclude that there was no evidence that Zirn’s death was caused by violent beating, rather 
than by suicide. Finally, the investigating magistrate paid no attention to Docteur Meliers’s 
testimony concerning the serious injuries Zirn had suffered. Similar disregard by the 
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prosecution authorities was also apparent in the dismissal of medical examination of the 
injuries suffered by Forissier in 1903.108 
Within a few days, Zirn’s death became highly politicised. The case was promoted by 
socialist organisations and politicians, with Pierre Laval using it as a platform for his political 
ambitions; the demonstrations in support of the Zirn family were organised by socialist 
organisations; and the case was extensively reported in far-left newspapers such as La Bataille 
Syndicaliste, Le Radical and Jean Jaurès’ L’Humanité. In contrast, it generated remarkably 
little attention in the moderate republican press. Le Temps and Le Siècle largely ignored this 
case, despite their long-standing concerns for transparency around allegations of police 
malpractice. La Lanterne published a few small notices in September that “an alcoholic” had 
died in police detention, and repeatedly misspelled Zirn’s name in a variety of ways.109 The 
unwillingness to engage with this incident can hardly be explained by the case itself. Only the 
political appropriation of Zirn’s death by socialists can explain the lack of interest in this case 
by the moderate republican press. For these fiercely anti-socialist publications, the fact that this 
case also played to the advantage of socialist political agendas seemed to override their long-
standing concerns for keeping police to account and challenging government to uphold certain 
standards of transparency and accountability. 
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VIII. THE CASE THAT WAS: THE FORISSIER AFFAIRE OF 1903 
 
In constrast to the Nuger and Zirn cases, the unusual circumstances that enabled the Forissier 
case to reach the court are revealing for the obstacles that generally prevented allegations 
against police personnel from getting to trial. On May 7, 1903 Sous-Brigardier Yon and Police 
Constable Goblet from the notorious Parisian vice squad, sought to arrest two respectable 
young ladies, for unregulated prostitution. Louise Forissier and her prospective sister in law, 
Madeleine Maugard,110 were only a few metres from the front door of their home when they 
were accosted by the two police officers. Antoine Forissier, brother and fiancé of the two young 
ladies, had just left them but returned when he heard their screams for help. Forissier, unaware 
that the two men were plain-clothes police officers, started a fight which led to his arrest and a 
solid beating both in the street and later at the police station, before his employer and influential 
family friends managed to secure his release late in the night. The details of this incident are 
typical of numerous descriptions of conflictual encounters between members of the public and 
plain-clothes officers from the vice squad. People who were arrested by any police unit 
consistently complained about being beaten while in custody – all to no avail. However, in a 
unique turn of events, the two policemen who arrested Antoine Forissier became subjected to 
criminal prosecution and conviction. 
Officers from the vice squad were particularly difficult to hold to account to the law 
because they operated on the basis of administrative decrees, rather than statute law. Women 
who were wrongly accused of engaging in unregulated street prostitution – as was the case with 
Louise Forissier and Madeleine Maugard – therefore found themselves in a limbo, where legal 
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guarantees of civil liberties and the provisions in the Penal Code on police accountability 
simply did not apply. French rights activists had vigorously challenged this principle since the 
1870s, yet by 1903 this was still to no avail.  
It was probably due to the personal connections of the Forissiers that their complaint 
was not stopped in its tracks. The two hapless police officers had unknowingly attacked people 
who were in an exceptionally strong position to fight back. Antoine Forissier was a journalist, 
specialised in reporting court cases for La Lanterne, so the first newspaper accounts of the case 
were penned by Forissier himself. The case soon generated a media storm that included not 
only the press that was traditionally critical of the police, but was also joined by the centre-
right and conservative press. On May 9, two days after the event, criminal allegations were 
presented to the public prosecutor on behalf of the Forissiers by their lawyer René Renoult, 
who was also member of the National Assembly, a leading member of the Radical Party and 
the LDH, as well as a barrister at the appeal court of Paris (avocat de la cour d’appel de 
Paris).111 The policemen were accused of “arbitrary arrest” (art.114), “damages” (art. 117) and 
“deliberate acts of violence” (art. 311).112 In a completely unprecedented move, the Forissiers 
also sued Police Prefect Lépine for civil responsibility for acts committed by his personnel. 
At that point Lépine himself suddenly changed his approach, which was quite out of 
character. In the morning of May 8, Lépine’s position was the usual staunch defence of his 
men, yet by the evening both Yon and Goblet were dismissed from office and a disciplinary 
inquiry had been opened by the contrôle général.113 A few days later Lépine made an 
uncharacteristically humble admission to the Paris municipal council that the initial 
explanations made by the two policemen for arresting the two young ladies, as well as most of 
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their claims against Antoine Forissier, were entirely untrue.114 The documents do not reveal 
what caused Lépine to change approach, but an article in La Lanterne claimed that the Forissier 
Affair affected Lépine’s ambitions to be elected senator in the Loire region. No evidence has 
been found to support this claim, but, if indeed Lépine had ambitions to become a senator, he 
could not ignore that the three Forissiers happened to be the son, the daughter and the daughter-
in-law of the chief editor of one of the leading republican newspapers in the Loire region, 
whose political support Lépine would need for any attempt to be elected.115 
The case reveals a number of deviations from standard procedures in how criminal 
allegations against police personnel were normally handled. The most obvious was the public 
disclosure of the report by the contrôle général. The internal disciplinary investigation started 
on May 8, before the Forissiers made a criminal complaint on May 9. The contrôle général 
was unusually quick to investigate the case, and because of the criminal complaint by the 
Forissiers, the contrôle général handed over their report and record of interviews to the public 
prosecutor already by May 11. Reports from the contrôle général were normally only for 
internal use, but because the case had now turned into a criminal investigation, it was shown 
to the lawyer acting for the Forissiers, whereby the content was disclosed to the public. 
Usually it was the reports from the contrôle général that established the “truth” about 
all complaints against the police. The narratives were clearly police-led and mainly served the 
purpose of providing the police prefect and the public prosecutor with a justification for 
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dismissing criminal allegations as groundless.116 It is therefore revealing that the report from 
the contrôle général into the Forissier case could not survive public scrutiny. It was derided in 
the press and, during the court hearings in July and August, the evidence presented in the report 
was comprehensively exposed as entirely unbelievable and obviously fabricated.117 The key 
witnesses for the defence of Yon and Goblet were two registered prostitutes whose statements 
were incoherent and illogical. Moreover, multiple independent witnesses testified that the two 
prostitutes, contrary to their testimony, had not been present at the scene. This was later 
confirmed by one of these women who admitted that she was forced by Yon and Goblet to act 
as witness and to lie under oath in support of their version of events. 
The publicity surrounding the case, and the repeated revelation of police-fabricated 
evidence and perjury, made it difficult for the public prosecutor not to let the case go to trial. 
The public prosecutor recommended that Yon and Goblet be tried before the lower criminal 
court (tribunal correctionnel),118 rather than before the higher court, the cour d’assises, which 
dealt with more serious crimes. He also recommended that the two policemen should not be 
prosecuted for “arbitrary arrest” on the grounds that this charge could only come into effect if 
the policemen could be shown to be deliberately malevolent in regard to the arrestee. According 
to the prosecutor Yon and Goblet had acted “in good faith”, and given that the more senior of 
the two had been strongly under the influence of alcohol, their actions were to be treated as an 
“error” rather than the criminal act of “arbitrary arrest”. On July 11, the court made two rulings 
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relating to the “competence” of the court and the exact charges to be brought against the two 
police officers. The judge rejected the defence’s claim that the court was “incompetent” to rule 
on administrative matters; both police officers were therefore to be charged with arbitrary arrest 
(art. 114) and damages (art. 117). However, in the civil case against Police Prefect Lépine the 
court declared itself “incompetent to interfere in administrative matters”.119 The final verdict 
of August 3, 1903 found Yon and Goblet guilty of violence and awarded damages; it gave both 
officers a one-year suspended prison sentence and ordered them to pay each of the young girls 
a sum of 100 francs in damages. The court also confirmed that no civil case could be made 
against Police Prefect Lépine, and reiterated that he could not be held responsible for acts 
committed by his personnel.120  
The Forissier case became a landmark in several respects. The immediate political 
consequence was that Interior Minister Combes established an extra-parliamentary 
commission to investigate the vice squad.121 The attempt to sue Police Prefect Lépine also 
constituted the first of several attempts by the LDH to hold senior police managers civilly 
responsible for acts committed by their personnel. That the civil case against Lépine was 
rejected on technical grounds is hardly surprising. As one anonymous commentator stated, this 
complaint should rightly have been brought before the Conseil d’État as the highest 
administrative court.122 So why did the Forissiers’ lawyer René Renoult seek civil suit instead? 
As an experienced lawyer and barrister at the appeal court of Paris, he was hardly unaware that 
Lépine could not be held legally responsible in a civil suit. It seems that the LDH was simply 
pushing for one successful court ruling that would create a precedent and force a change in the 
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long-established separation of administrative jurisdiction from civil and criminal jurisdiction. 
Moreover, in the publications of the LDH, frequent references are made to the need for 
introducing constitutional guarantees against arbitrary arrest along the lines of the English 
Habeas Corpus. In a speech to the British Personal Rights Association in 1903, Yves Guyot 
described the case against Yon and Goblet as just one more proof that in France public officials 
were beyond accountability to the law.123 Interestingly, the same criticism was made by Albert 
Gigot,124 the Police Prefect of Paris who had resigned in 1879 in response to Guyot’s 
allegations of serious malpractice within the Paris police force.  
In another highly publicised case of 1904, the LDH helped Antoinette Favre from Lyon 
to launch a civil suit against three policemen from the vice squad. As in the Forissier case, the 
LDH made sure that Favre got first class legal assistance through Jean Appleton, a founding 
member of LDH, law professor at the University of Lyon and barrister at the appeal court in 
Lyon. The case first went through the tribunal civil and then through the Cour de Lyon, both 
of which declared that the acts of policemen from the vice squad were administrative acts that 
could not be challenged in civil or criminal courts. However, an unprecedented ruling from the 
Lyon appeal court finally established, for the first time, that when a woman was arrested by the 
vice squad, this constituted a juridical, rather than simply an administrative act.125 Accordingly, 
Antoinette Favre was allowed to bring civil suit against the three members of the vice squad, 
and won compensation for damages. This, however, did not mean that the policemen 
responsible for her arrest were liable to criminal prosecution. 
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Complainants continued to face an uphill struggle in bringing criminal or civil 
prosecution. In 1908 a young girl, Valérie Le Plard, again with the assistance of the LDH, 
launched criminal as well as civil charges against two police officers from the Parisian vice 
squad for illegal arrest on false charges of unregulated prostitution.126 In an act of public 
shaming to demonstrate the absurdity of the legal arguments used by the public prosecutor in 
rejecting the case, the LDH published the full text of his recommendation to the prosecution 
authorities (la chambre des mises en accusation) as well as the correspondence between them 
and Le Plard’s lawyer. The correspondence revealed that the public prosecutor’s rejection of 
Le Plard’s complaint rested entirely on statements by policemen from the vice squad who all 
claimed to have seen Le Plard soliciting in various places. The public prosecutor thereby chose 
to ignore the testimony of independent witnesses who provided Le Plard with an alibi at least 
for the majority of dates when the police claimed she had been seen soliciting. Nevertheless, 
the chambre des mises en d’accusation followed the recommendation from the public 
prosecutor and rejected the case against the police officers, while charging Le Plard with the 
legal costs. However, the LDH was pushing the boundaries, and the Le Plard case got much 
closer to the courtroom than any previous case, except for that of the Forissiers. 
Le Plard did not get her day in court. Yet the police and the judiciary were unable to 
prevent the documents from being published by the LDH, much to the embarrassment of both 
institutions. Le Plard became the poster-girl for civil liberties campaigns against the Paris 
police in general, and the vice squad in particular. So despite failure to get more cases to court, 
the involvement of the LDH became a game-changer for an increasing number of complaints 
against police personnel and gendarmes from across the French territory. It placed police 
managers, prosecutors and successive interior ministers on the defensive, forced them to 
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release documents that were not normally made available to complainants, and repeatedly 




IX. NON-PROSECUTION OF POLICE PERSONNEL  
AND ITS IMPACTS ON POLICE LEGITIMACY 
 
The non-prosecution of police personnel in highly publicised cases of serious misconduct and 
illegality inevitably undermined the attempts by Police Prefect Lépine to improve the image 
and the legitimacy of the Paris police.127 In order to understand why the practice of non-
prosecution persisted, despite its detrimental impact on police legitimacy and public trust, it is 
worth comparing the ideological construction of police legitimacy in the French Third Republic 
with the function of police accountability in legitimising policing in Victorian/Edwardian 
Britain and Wilhelmine Prussia. In France, police accountability was never explicitly 
formulated and integrated into the official rhetoric as it was in Britain through the Peelite 
principles. French police legitimacy in relation to the citizenry rested on the commitment to 
defend citizens’ safety and protect their possessions against crime and disorder committed by 
other citizens. These principles mostly dated from the revolutionary era, and were carried over 
to later regimes.128 In relation to the Third Republic, contemporary politicians and later 
historians have agreed that police legitimacy consisted in the loyal defence of the regime, and 
in the effective enforcement of orders issued by democratically elected ministers and mayors, 
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as well as their officials.129 In Paris, individual policemen were accountable to the disciplinary 
code, to their superiors, and ultimately to the police prefect who was, in turn, accountable to 
the interior minister.130 No mention was made in the official police rhetoric of individual 
policemen being accountable to the law or to the public.  
Accordingly, neither Lépine nor the judiciary nor successive interior ministers 
attempted to project the impression that courts played a role in sanctioning illegalities 
committed by the police. Victims of serious police malpractice could only hope that the 
transgressing policeman would be disciplined by his superior. Yet, the report from the contrôle 
general that was made public during the trial of Yon and Goblet in the Forissier Affair of 1903, 
rather than showing the good functioning of the internal disciplinary procedures, amply 
demonstrated contempt for the victims of police violence and malpractice. This did nothing to 
improve public confidence in the willingness of the Paris police to handle malpractice 
internally. In the eyes of the public, the lack of transparency and the suspicion that the judiciary 
colluded with the police in keeping erring officers away from the dock were arguably more 
damaging than the illegal acts in themselves.131  
This was very different from Britain, where police legitimacy was based on the idea 
that police personnel were ‘citizens in uniform’, subjected to the same laws as civilian members 
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of the public, and that the police was not an instrument of government.132 As successive British 
governments could be confident that policemen would loyally defend the regime if necessary, 
concepts of police legitimacy were structured exclusively around the relationship with the 
public. The covenant between police and public rested on the commitment by the police to act 
legally, with proportionate force, and with accountability to the public as well as to the law. 
According to the official police rhetoric, policing was only legitimate if the public trusted that 
the police acted according to these principles, and that robust and transparent control 
mechanisms were in place to sanction serious transgressions.133 Accordingly, it was crucial for 
the legitimacy of British policing that allegations of criminal acts were seen to be robustly 
handled by the criminal justice system, and in some cases, investigated by a parliamentary 
commission.134 British police managers were therefore not able to defend their personnel at all 
costs, although, in practice, they had multiple ways of sheltering their men, and the vast 
majority of criminal allegations against police personnel never got anywhere near the courts. 
Cases of criminal prosecution were presented to the public as reassuring evidence that police 
managers and the criminal justice system were both willing and able to punish illegality and 
excessive violence. This also allowed police to claim that malpractice, rather than being 
systemic, was isolated to a few ‘rotten apples’. 
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In Prussia, the legitimacy of policing underwent significant transformations from the 
Bismarck era to the Wilhelmine era of the 1890s. The principle that the authority and interests 
of the state prevailed over citizens’ rights had deep roots in the absolutist tradition, and was 
further strengthened by Napoleonic influences on Prussian reforms of the early 19th century. 
Yet, Bismarck slowly and reluctantly recognised the Rechtsstaat principle that public officials 
had to operate within the boundaries of the law and that the interests of the state could not 
prevail over citizens’ rights. For Bismarck this was the price for getting the liberal opposition 
to accept the political compromises that allowed the ruling Prussian establishment to maintain 
its influence, and after 1871 their acceptance of his construction of German unification from 
above.135 With broad consensus among mainstream legal scholars that the Rechtsstaat principle 
committed police to act within the boundaries of the law, Prussian courts increasingly 
functioned as an integral part of the police accountability mechanisms. During the 1890s, it 
became all the more urgent to strengthen the legitimacy of the police and the criminal justice 
system, as the Social Democratic Party used police malpractice and evidence of 
unaccountability very effectively to undermine the legitimacy, not just of Prussian policing, 
but of the political regime. By the Wilhelmine era, the idea that the interests of the state 
prevailed over citizens’ rights was no longer seriously discussed, but had become associated 
with absolutist arbitrary rule of a bygone era.136  
In France, by contrast, the continued practice of non-prosecution of police personnel 
became ideologically tied up with the notion that the survival of the Republic depended on the 
ability of the police to intervene with unrestricted force against actions that were seen as 
potentially harmful to the Republic. So rather than being associated with arbitrary absolutist 
rule, the position of French police personnel outside the reach of the law was justified in the 
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name of respect for the authority of a democratic, progressive republican regime. Yet, as the 
regime stabilised, the continued refusal to allow allegations of police illegality to be tried in 
open court became increasingly difficult to defend.  
So why did the critics fail to force governments to change this practice? Firstly, the 
fiercest critics of this practice were also staunch republicans, who did not want to undermine 
the legitimacy of the Republic, and therefore had to strike a careful balance in their attacks on 
police unaccountability without hurting the legitimacy of the Republic. Secondly, the political 
fragmentation in the population and the press allowed successive interior ministers to avoid 
addressing the uncomfortable issue of police unaccountability to the law. While many groups 
criticised police violations against members of their own group, they were prepared to accept 
police acting without legal restrictions against their political opponents. As the Zirn case 
suggests, even French civil liberties activists were willing to overlook police illegality and 
accept unaccountability if the victim was supported by an opposing political faction. 
For successive interior ministers the main priority remained to keep the fragile covenant 
between the Third Republic and the Paris police force intact. Sheltering police personnel from 
individual responsibility was central to this covenant, and any other concern was secondary. 
This priority solved short-term embarrassment over malpractice involving police violence and 
illegality. Yet, the lack of transparency and the secretive handling of citizens’ grievances 
exacerbated suspicions of systematic cover-ups of violence and malpractice, and fuelled 
vitriolic attacks on the republican system from the far-left and the far-right. It also gave 
credence to the “black legend” of French policing, including conspiracy theories that depicted 
the Paris police as the henchmen of a self-serving republican establishment and the repository 
of dirty secrets that dared not see the light of day. In the long run, the continued shrouding of 
police malpractice in institutional opaqueness and the refusal to allow serious police illegalities 






Between 1871  and 1914, French practice of not prosecuting police personnel became ever 
more at odds with developments in Britain and Prussia, where courts played an increasing role 
in mediating conflicts between police personnel and individual citizens. Leaning on the 
republican principle that the interests of the Republic and respect for public authorities 
prevailed over citizens’ rights and liberties, successive French governments were unwilling to 
strengthen the position of citizen in any way. With the French judiciary at all levels refusing to 
enforce the Penal Code against police in active service, aggrieved citizens continued to be 
barred from taking legal action against violations committed by the police. It was highly ironic 
for a regime that saw itself as politically progressive and a beacon of human rights, that the 
rationale of defending progressive and liberal republican ideals, which was also used to deny 
French women were denied the right to vote until 1944, justified the maintenance of citizens 
in an almost completely powerless position in relation to transgressive policing.  
 
The discrepancies between French practices and developments in other European and North 
American countries challenges historians to continue their critical reassessment of the 
implications of French republican values within a comparative perspective. British policing has 
long been hailed for its levels of accountability to the public, with French and Prussian policing 
held up as the negative counter-image to public-oriented policing. Despite much research 
highlighting the often inglorious reality of British policing behind the positive public rhetoric, 
British policing did maintain higher levels of police accountability compared to both France 
and Prussia. Nevertheless, French practices fall considerably behind developments in Prussia. 
This is a provocative finding, as historians of the German Empire commonly deride limitations 
on police accountability as a reflection of the semi-democratic elite-driven political regime. In 
contrast, as most historians working on nineteenth-century France hold a fundamentally 
positive attitude towards the Third Republic and its values, the republican regime had been 
held to much lower standards over its policing practices than the German Empire. Poor policing 
practices have been explained away as Jacobin and Napoleonic legacies that were carried over 
into the Third Republic, or justified as necessary for the defence of the republican regime. Yet, 
the French Republic maintained these features while Prussia, despite its strong absolutist and 
state-oriented traditions, strengthened structures of police accountability to the citizens under 
successive conservative and elite-driven governments with no liberal or progressive ideology. 
The Third Republic extended democratic participation; yet the refusal to empower citizens and 
its failure to develop legal and procedural frameworks by which citizens could meaningfully 
defend their rights and liberties became a long-term heavy legacy affecting French police-
public relations right through to the 21st century.  
 
 
